Laos’s engagements with the great powers have taken center stage in 2024. The country’stenure as chair of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) comes at a sensitive geopolitical juncture for the regional bloc, with Lao elitesexpressing concern regarding ASEAN’s role as a major power proxy in the international arena.
As competition within the region escalates, Vientiane’s economic dependence upon external powers necessitates a careful balancing act, primarily driven by the government’s desires for regime survival and political legitimacy. In recent years, Laos’s relations with China have significantly strengthened by way ofmilitary engagements,trade, andinfrastructure investment. Vientiane’s desire to forge closer relations with Beijing has revealed a glaring blind spot in U.S. regional engagement, prompting U.S. officials to leveragecriticism of China’s “debt-trap diplomacy” in Laos by catering engagement efforts to economic development.
However, the United States must engage with Laos in a holistic manner, reframing engagement upon a triad of policy issues to improve conditions on the ground in Laos: war reconciliation efforts, governance reforms, and law enforcement. By understanding the nuanced legacy of U.S. engagement in Laos, the United States can reform its approach to maximize its impact and influence in the country.
Historical Overview of U.S.-Laos Relations
The United States and Laos have a complicated history, hindered by the legacy of the interventions and bombing campaigns the United States conducted during the Vietnam War, and ideological divisions due to Laos’s communist government. Full diplomatic relations between the countriesbegan in 1955 following Lao independence from colonial France. However, the Laotian Civil War between the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party (LPRP) and the U.S.-backed Royal Lao Government,occurring between 1953 and 1975, drastically soured bilateral relations between the two countries. Throughout the period, the United Statesengaged in a series of military interventions in Laos known as the “Secret War,” which included the arming and training of Hmong communities and other guerilla units, and the most intense bombing campaign in history. The Secret Warbecame a key proxy conflict amid the broader Vietnam War.
U.S.-Laos relations further deteriorated after the LPRP, a communist regime, came to power at the conclusion of the Laotian Civil War. The LPRP immediatelyaligned itself with the Soviet bloc and Vietnam, resulting in the severe downgrade of U.S. representation after 1975. But following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Washington’s relations with Vientiane gradually improved, with U.S. officials visiting the country, including then-secretary of state Hillary Clinton in 2012 and then-president Barack Obama in 2016. In the broader historical context, the two countries’ diplomatic relations have only recently developed, yet they formallyannounced a comprehensive partnership in 2016.
Contemporary U.S. Engagement in Laos
Washington has directed efforts toward war reconciliation, economic development, and decarbonization in Laos, driven in part by a desire to counter China’s prominence.
The historical legacy of the Secret War remains a sensitive feature of bilateral relations. Laos was the victim of U.S. bombing and herbicides due to its role inproviding supplies to North Vietnamese fighters along the Ho Chi Minh Trail, which ran through the country. After heavy bombing, Laos became the most bombed country per capita in history. Hence, the United States, in collaboration with non-profit organizations, has taken steps toclear unexploded ordinance (UXO) as part of its war reconciliation efforts. USAID hascontributed over $100 million to support UXO clearance programs over the last 20 years, reducing annual casualties from over 300 to fewer than 50 as part of its war reconciliation efforts.
Further, approximately 600,000 gallons of herbicides weresprayed by U.S. forces along the Lao portion of the Ho Chi Minh Trail, impacting 165,000 acres of land andresulting in dioxin-related congenital disabilities among Lao people. While the United States hasfocused on environmental remediation in Vietnam, little testing has been done in Laos to confirm the dioxin’s presence and broader health impacts toward Lao people.
The United States has also sought to distinguish itself through economic engagement, hoping to provide a counterweight to China’s investments. Western criticisms of China’s “debt trap diplomacy” and local disenchantment with China’sCovid-19 restrictions have tainted the seemingly friendly relations between China and Laos, proving that China’s economic footprint in Laos is no silver bullet. The Lao-China railway wasmet with controversy given its funding structure: 70 percent of the railway's construction costs were paid for by China, while Laos borrowed for the remainder of the cost. Laos’s rising debts and weakening currency have furtherreinforced the belief that the risks of Chinese investment far exceed its alleged benefits.
While Laos is one of the least developed countries in the region, its steady economic development has sparked rising interest in Washington. The United States haspursued a strategy of development assistance within Laos, with USAID’s annual budget for the country this year totaling to $48 million. As part of Laos’s position in the Mekong subregion and long-term mission of being the“battery of Southeast Asia” through energy exports, the United States also has an interest incontributing to the country’s decarbonization efforts. Notable engagements include launching projects toexpand electric vehicle capacity,assisting in clean energy deployment through the Japan-U.S.-Mekong Power Partnership, andencouraging energy diversification to non-hydro power sources.
However, such a reactive strategy fails to adequately distinguish U.S. engagement in Laos from other external partners, instead reinforcing the United States’ lagging role compared to China’s exhaustive engagement channels. Despite emerging developments, Washington continues tolag behind Beijing in the realm of diplomacy and investment, ultimately failing to make a substantive dent in its engagements with Vientiane.
Broadening Cooperation: War Reconciliation & Law Enforcement
To broaden cooperation with Laos, the United States should effectively reassess its engagement with Laos to consider the historical legacies of the Secret War and Washington’s value add to the country. Although Laos may not initially be viewed as strategic compared to other countries in mainland Southeast Asia, the United States’ responsibility following the Secret War should incentivize Washington to improve relations with Vientiane through increased engagement.
While U.S.-China competition forms the backdrop of diplomatic relations in Laos, such a framing fails to consider Laos’s active pursuit in forging closer relations with China to gain political legitimacy. Chinese assistance hasserved as an ideological buffer for Western-backed investments, allowing the communist LPRP to pursue its political objectives without acquiescing to governance reforms often demanded by the West. Chinese investment has furtherbolstered the LPRP’s political legitimacy, giving the party the autonomy to steer its country’s national development. Thus, Washington should seek to boost bilateral relations and leverage Laos’s desire for political legitimacy on the global stage.
Beyond broad strategies, U.S. engagement should focus on people-to-people ties, revolving around war reconciliation efforts, support to civil society, and law enforcement. While USAID’s programming efforts have already resulted in significant progress in these three areas, the success of these ties depends upon cultivating relationships on the ground to ensure maximum impact.
First, within the realm of war reconciliation, Washington should focus on adequately addressing issues related to the deployment of Agent Orange by engaging in environmental remediation and dioxin cleanup throughout parts of Laos. Further, Washington should bolster education initiatives within Laos to prioritize knowledge transfer of the Secret War. Washington should endeavor to make classified archival data from the war publicly accessible to spur broader research interest. Equal efforts should be made to substantively engage with the Lao diaspora in the United States to contribute to theircultural preservation efforts. Lastly, much like theestablishment of Fulbright University in Vietnam, Washington should recenter efforts to cultivate trust between the two countries through professional exchanges and training programs. Lastly, Washington should continue todirect funding toward initiatives among civil society organizations that foster accessibility for individuals with disabilities in rural areas within Laos, many of whom are victims of UXO.
Second, given Laos’s concerns with transnational crime and human trafficking, the United States should strengthen law enforcement cooperation efforts. Laos’s location in the Golden Triangle region leaves its citizensvulnerable to scam operations due to a lack of career opportunities. Authorities in northern Laos notablyordered all illegal call centers to cease operations within its borders, indicating the Lao government’s rising demand to mitigate the online scam industry’s presence. Thus, Washington could be a vital partner in convening Lao officials with international organizations, such as Interpol, to strengthen law enforcement and judicial efforts on the ground. Further, Washington shouldcontinue to provide technical expertise in cultivating opportunities among Laos’s small and medium enterprises to empower local businesses and emphasize financial inclusion.
Washington should endeavor to pursue engagements with Laos in a comprehensive manner, engaging in capacity building efforts that extend beyond the prism of geopolitical competition. While relations between the United States and Laos are limited compared to China’s expansive presence, the United States should respect Laos on its own merit and actively foster people-to-people ties with individuals and civil society organizations on the ground. Pursuing a broader strategy based on war reconciliation and law enforcement cooperation ensures that Washington can support Laos’s political and economic development as a collaborative partner to effectively elevate bilateral ties.
Amelie De Leon is a former research intern with the Southeast Asia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.
